Barth's Moral Theology:
Human Action in Barth's Thought
By John Webster. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark. 1998. Pp. ix + 223.
Reviewed by: George
Hunsinger
Whether there is indeed such a thing
as "human freedom" in relation to God is not a question that divides one
theology from another or one church from the next. No theology or church would deny it.
The disputed question, rather, concerns the conditions for the possibility of such
freedom. Moreover, whether divine grace is a "necessary condition" for human
freedom is again not divisive, at least not for the great majority of ecumenical
theologies and churches, since exponents of vulgar "Pelagianism" are rare (and
may not even have included Pelagius). The divisive question actually cuts much deeper. It
pertains to the matter of how divine grace and human freedom are related. Formally
speaking (and leaving much aside), the options would seem broadly to be twofold. Either
the relationship is fully or largely intelligible without resort to paradox, or else it is
not. Interpretations that are more nearly philosophical or rationalistic in orientation
tend to eschew paradoxical solutions. Those that are more nearly biblical or
hermeneutical, on the other hand, are more likely to rest in solutions that are in some
measure paradoxical, and sometimes paradoxical to a high degree.
It is not a good sign
for the state of theological discussion that these rather fundamental
observations are often overlooked. In the modern period it 
has often been assumed
that paradoxical solutions have no standing, though one would
be hard pressed to find a time when the paradoxical option has
lacked distinguished representatives. After all, the Augustinian
tradition on grace and freedom has shown a substantial tolerance
for paradox on the grounds that paradox is the worst form of solution
-- except for every other form. Nonparadoxical solutions are thought
to suffer from two major defects. They fail to be hermeneutically
adequate with respect to the biblical witness, and they end up
endorsing one of two mistakes: either an untenable determinism
(by pitting sovereign grace against freedom) or else an equally
untenable libertarianism (by pitting independent freedom against
grace). Augustinian paradoxes are designed precisely to avoid
pitting grace against freedom (and vice versa). From an Augustinian
standpoint, charges of "determinism" from exponents
of non-paradoxical solutions usually betray an untenable libertarianism,
whether crude in form or subtle. Moreover, charges of "incoherence"
from the same camp typically fail to advance the discussion, since
they simply beg the question of adequacy, often, it seems, unwittingly.
Exponents of non-paradoxical solutions often seem to proceed as
though deliberately paradoxical solutions must be as non-paradoxical
as their own.
Karl Barth has been a distinguished
representative of the Augustinian tradition on grace and freedom in our time. He has
represented it in the radicalized form that it received from the Reformation, and
particularly from Luther and Calvin. He has done so largely on the grounds of
hermeneutical adequacy to Holy Scripture, and in a climate dominated by modernist,
philosophical and rationalistic modes of thought that presuppose the inadmissability of
paradox. Consequently, he has often been rebuffed as an ugly duckling. How often has it
been alleged that no place exists in his thought for "human freedom" as though
the status of human freedom were self-evident? How often has his position been charged
with "determinism" and "incoherence". How often has it been overlooked
that the Reformation version of the Augustinian tradition involves a very different
theological framework or conceptual scheme than that presupposed by the critique? How
often has a satisfactory discussion been thwarted because it has not been seen that
decisions on these matters are not framework-neutral but framework-relative?
Two outstanding books
on the place of human action in Barth's theology have recently
appeared from John Webster, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity
at Oxford University. The first, "Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation"
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), offers a way of reading Barth's
Church Dogmatics that takes seriously the inseparability Barth
posited between dogmatics and ethics. Based mostly on Barth's
very last writings, it challenges interpretations that accuse
Barth of passivity with respect to human freedom and of incoherence
with respect to conceptual adequacy. In both cases, Webster argues,
the accusations fail to grasp Barth's "moral ontology",
a term borrowed from Charles Taylor to indicate the fundamental
situation in which human beings act. The second volume, here under
review, again takes up the question of "
moral ontology", (a
term analogous to my previous remarks about theological "frameworks"
or "conceptual schemes") with nine essays, discussing
material that runs all the way from the earlier to the later Barth.
Although Webster does not make the aspect of "paradox"
-- or perhaps better, of "dialectic" or unresolved "antithesis"
-- quite as explicit as I might have (he makes no mention of what
I have called "the Chalcedonian pattern"), his grasp
of Barth is unerring. No better scholarship on these matters can
be found in English. Together the two volumes establish Webster
as one of the leading Barth interpreters in the world.
The essays are as engaging and
interesting as they are important in dispelling misconceptions. After an introductory
chapter that presents the book in survey, the topics are as follows: human action in
Barth's early ethics (ch. 2), grace as "the great disruption" of moral
consciousness (ch. 3), original sin in Barth's "actualistic" reinterpretation
(ch. 4), human action as witness to hope in a world where "God is the framework of
eschatology, not vice versa"; (Barth in a remark against Moltmann) (ch. 5), human
spontaneity as at once elicited and delimited by divine action (ch. 6), the church's
mission in the context of Christ's prophetic office (ch. 7), grace and freedom in Luther
and Barth (ch. 8), and finally how the passive reception of grace by faith relates to
active correspondence to grace i the Christian life (ch. 9). The thought-provoking power
of Barth's theology in articulating the continuing relevance of the Augustinian tradition
(as mediated by the Reformation) comes through admirably at every point.
Many themes from this rich and
stimulating discussion might be singled out for extensive comment. As Webster keenly
notes, in Barth the modernist tendency to demote God into an instrumental value for human
self-realization is rejected. Human activity is liberated from the dehumanizing effect of
having to be the bearer of God's kingdom. The absolute singularity of God's action in
human salvation is acknowledged. Complex interconnections among witness, participation
(koinonia) and mediation in faithful human activity are delineated. The inescapability of
divine judgment in the work of divine grace is not slighted. The inwardness tradition is
subordinated to attentive response. The great Reformation theme is sounded that Jesus
Christ is the entire ground and reality, not just the precondition, of our salvation. The
crucial difference between explanatory and descriptive accounts of human freedom is
recognized. That grace is fully trinitarian and christocentric for Barth is explained.
That we are seen not as outsiders to grace unless we become insiders, but as insiders
whether we live by it or not, is stressed. That the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and
the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ speaks for himself is taken with the seriousness it
deserves. The significance of becoming in the conception of the divine being is not
missed. These and other themes in Webster's sensitive account are as welcome as they are
beautifully set forth. The one theme that perhaps bears special mention, however, is the
intrinsic perfection of Christ's work.
It is greatly to Webster's
credit that he accords such prominence to this theme. That there is only one work of
salvation, that it has been accomplished by Jesus Christ, that it is identical with his
person, and that being perfect it needs no supplementation but only acknowledgement,
reception, participation, anticipation, and proclamation for what it is -- these are the
great themes of Barth's soteriology. Though they may separate Barth from much modernist,
traditionalist and ecumenical theology, at least in the single-mindedness with which he
set them forth, he believed they are nonetheless themes by which the church stands or
falls. Whether his judgment was correct in this matter is a question that awaits adequate
discussion by the ecumenical church. John Webster has gone a long way toward restoring
this question to its proper place on the agenda of theology and church.